A new Cold War

Edited by : Sanjaya Baru and Rahul Sharma

Publisher: Harper Collins

Pages: 320

It is often said that we shouldn’t judge a book by its cover. But when it comes to this particular book, its cover is what captivates the eye. The front is beautiful and the back has a litany of who’s who of international relations. By the time I had finished reading those names, I had already made up my mind to read this book. Apart from this, there is a substantive reason on why one must read this book. This is because the world is increasingly getting bipolar , with US and China forming the two poles. Few analysts have already declared that we are amidst a cold war , the clear manifestations of which can be seen in the form of the trade war, the Quad ,the AUKUS, pivot to Indo-pacific, the Democracy summit , etc

But how did we reach here? This is precisely the question that the book tries to answer. As evident from the cover, the book marks the 50 years of then US secretary of state, Henry kissinger’s secret visit to China, brokered by Pakistan. Realism is the timeless wisdom of international relations. Nobody understood this better than Kissinger. His realpolitik lied in the fact that he understood that the world had to be made tripolar , by recognising China as a major power and subsequently offering the People’s Republic of China the permanent seat of UNSC, that had been hitherto occupied by Republic of China(Taiwan), thus legitimising the “One China principle.” 

Impact of judgements are often judged based on the timing on which they are taken. 1971 was a watershed in many ways. The US was involved in the Vietnam quagmire , India and pakistan were at loggerheads along the East pakistan border and the relations between China and the Soviet Union were at historically low, finally culminating in the Sino-soviet split by the end of 1970s. “Enemy’s enemy is friend.” Everyone knows this. But Kissinger applied it. This is not to say that the rapprochement was purely Kissingerian genius, it was a view that had already taken roots in US establishment , with Nixon writing about it in his essay in the foreign affais in 1967, i.e. before he became the President. 

Through secret meetings, ping pong games and recognition of “one china principle”,the US finally achieved its goal of winning the cold war. However this view is contented by Sanjaya baru in his chapter. To quote him “ Soviet Union imploded under its own internal contradictions and a sluggish economy. What the US rapprochement actually did was to help china become a geoeconomic power.” This may be true to some extent. The credit for the breakup of Soviet Union is given not to US , but to the policies of Gorbachev, viz. the perestroika and the glasnost. Though, it did help the US in other arenas as well. It was the proverbial stone that had hit many birds. The US achieved its objective to get Japan to double its expenditure on self defence forces, Taiwan’s leverage over the US diminished, and the Soviet union hurriedly concluded anti ballistic missile and strategic arms limitation treaties with the US.

But victories come at a cost. And the tactical victory in the cold war, by taking china on board, is now threatening to become a strategic defeat for the USA. It is said that everyone is wise in the hindsight. And when we now look at it, it seems China had been playing “the long game” (also the title of Vijay Gokhale’s new book on how the Chinese negotiate with India and which I personally enjoyed and would recommend). Or in the words of Deng Xiaoping, “China was hiding its capabilities and biding its time.” All the powers in history, that had challenged the US, could never cross 60% of US GDP in their life. But China today is not only the largest economy in purchasing power parity, it is poised to overtake the US in market prices sooner or later. The question is not of if, but of when. The blame for this does not only lies at the feet of Nixon and Kissinger.

Nixon’s opening to china did provide impetus for China’s economic reforms. But eventually Clinton ignored China’s mercantilist policies and deliberate devaluation of yuan. He admitted it in WTO.  Obama even flirted with the idea of G2. So subsequent US presidents have their own fair share of blame to help China rise. The kissinger moment provided the fillip to what was long overdue .This approach saw continuation with subsequent regimes because of kissnger’s influence in american diplomatic and administrative circles even after he ceased to be the secretary of state. The underlying logic was to make China dependent on US for its exports. But this logic is now turned on its head with china weaponising the world’s dependence on its supply chains as can be seen during the covid(hence the call for Atmanirbharta).  Kissinger too had been complicit and he lobbied for the Chinese and american businesses to establish closer relations with each other. Sanjaya baru calls them as “kissinger associates inc.” There was bipartisan consensus that integrating china would help it making a more responsible stakeholder. The floor is open to debate, if it has actually nudged Chine to become so.

One chapter that particularly impressed me, was of Kishore Mahbubani. It is titled “evil liberalism vs moral pragmatism.” It is a critic of US foreign policy , particularly after the end of cold war. He argues that Fukuyama’s “end of history” and George Kennan’s “concept of spiritual vitality” had created a sense of hubris in the US establishment. To quote kennan, it led to “ delusions of superiority” in the minds of US policy makers. In this “delusiuon of superiority” , the US went on to commit three strategic mistakes, as pointed out by mahbubani in his chapter. The first was not paying attention to living standards of Americans.After 1991, the income of bottom 50% in US has stagnated and in china it has risen. He says “US today is becoming USSR of yesterday.” The second was to thoughtlessly expand NATO. This has been criticised unanimously by Kennan and Mearsheimer. Though kissinger wanted to expand NATO to eastern europe , he cautioned it to expand in Ukraine. Mearsheimer has received lot of flak on the social media for pointing out the obvious. He contends that Ukraine has been a victim of superpower rivalry and this is the cost that it has to pay for being a neighbour of one of the powers. The third mistake was to invade Afghanistan,Iraq and Libya. It not just led to loss of trillions of dollars and thousands of innocent lives , but aided the rise of non state actors in the form of terrorism.

The other chapters of the book deal with regional perspectives like impact of US china rapprochement on Pakistan, japan, india, ASEAN, Australia,etc. Chapters by Suhasini Haider, C Raja Mohan(particularly for India’s perspective) and Tanvi Madan are too worth a read. Also, I liked the chapter by Rahul Sharma for its simplicity . However, since the book is largely based on the the 1971 July meeting between kissinger and Zhou-en-lai, there is repeatition of facts across chapters. Also, since this book is a collection of essays,  one chapter doesn't naturally lead to another. So an element of disjointedness appears. Finally, I would conclude by saying “ some books are good, some are bad, and some are timely.” It is in the last category that I would place the book.

Post script: 

My essay on the US-China-India triangle that was inspired from a debate amongst John J Mearsheimer, Samir saran and Kishore Mahbubani would provide further analysis of the issue at hand - https://utkarshjdwivedi.blogspot.com/2020/06/us-china-india-geopolitical-triangle.html

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